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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issues of measurement of Russia’s dependence on oil and 
gas as well its attempts for diversification with shift toward a technology-centered 
economy. It further develops the Russia’s input-output system to provide a better 
understanding of these issues. First, it clarifies the extent of the GDP of the mining 
(oil and gas) sector in Russia by modifying the original supply and use tables. 
Second, it provides an analysis of the diversification attempts through development 
of light automobiles by extending the supply and use tables. Third, it presents an 
attempt of multi-sectoral growth accounting based on our estimations of capital 
stock, focusing on the capital and TFP (Total Factor Productivity) contributions to 
growth.  
 
Key Words: Russia, oil dependence, diversification, input-output, growth accounting 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The importance of the Russian oil and gas industry to the Russian economy as 
well as to the global energy markets is rather obvious when we look at statistics of 
proved reserves and foreign trade of oil and gas. Russia accounted for 13 percent 
of global crude oil exports and 27 percent of global pipeline gas exports in 2007. 
And internally, the shares of oil and gas in the country’s export and GDP in 2007 
were 62.0 and 16.9 percent respectively (the corresponding shares in 2005 were 
61.6 and 19.5 percent, respectively). Excluding refined oil or oil processing 
products, the shares of crude oil and gas in the country’s export and GDP were 
47.2 and 12.9 percent respectively (the corresponding shares in 2005 were 47.6 and 
15.0 percent respectively). 
2  
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2  All figures are derived from BP (2009), External (2007, 2008), the Rosstat data 
(www.gks.ru) and the Bank of Russia data (www.cbr.ru). 
 
 
1However, when we look at GDP statistics compiled by Rosstat (Russian 
Statistical Office) based on the System of National Accounts (1993) and data 
supplied by enterprise units, the country’s dependence on oil and gas is less    clear. 
The problem with the official Russian figure is that it is very low. The share of the 
oil and gas sector in the Russian GDP under the traditional industrial classification 
(OKONKH) is 7.8 percent in 2000 and 6.8 percent in 2003.
3 The share of the mining 
sector in the country’s GDP under the new industrial classification (NACE v.1; 
OKVED) is still low, namely 10.2 percent in 2005 and 8.1 percent in 2008 as seen 
below. In this paper, we offer alternative figures for the better understanding of 
the specific characteristics of the Russian economy. Although our estimation 
following Kuboniwa et al. (2005) is preliminary, it is sufficient to pose an important 
problem that  should be resolved with Rosstat’s cooperation. Our attempt also 
provides the manufacturing sector’s GDP not only at basic prices but also at 
producers’ prices or market prices that may be useful for an international 
comparison of industrial structure. 
 As Gaddy (2004, p. 346) points out, Russia’s oil and gas sector will continue, 
for the predictable future, to be the key to the country’s economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the recent policy direction for reforming Russia’s industrial 
structure should also be noted and studied. As is well known, the Russian 
government adopted a policy to target diversification away from heavy dependence 
on oil and gas. A hopeful factor for this diversification and modernization of the 
Russian economy would be further development of the auto-industry, including 
domestic production (assembly) of light automobiles (passenger cars) by foreign 
companies. This paper provides a preliminary observation on the Russian 
auto-industry using unpublished versions of input-output tables. 
A variety of desirable applications of input-output tables is possible. Due to 
the lack of appropriate data, we confine ourselves here to an application of 
multi-sector data to growth accounting for the further development of our analyses 
of Russian optimal growth configurations  for  diversification.     
     
2.  How large is the Mining Sector of Russia? 
 
The official figure for the share of the oil and gas sector in the Russian GDP 
                                                        
3  OKONKH (obshesoiuzhyi krassifikator otraslei narodnogo khoziastva; all-union classification 
of sectors of the national economy). OKVED (obsherossiiskii krassifikator vidov ekonomisheskoi 
deiatel’nosti; all-Russian classification of economic activities). See Otdel’hye,  2004..     
 
 
2for 1991-2003 can be derived only from the input-output tables for corresponding 
years compiled by Rosstat. As stated, the problem with the official Russian figure 
is that it is very low. When we add a part of the value added attributed to the trade 
and transportation sectors (as trade and transportation margins and net taxes on 
oil and gas) to the official figure, we obtain substantially different figures: 24.1 
percent in 2000 and 19.8 in 2003. These figures are shown in Table 1, the updated 
version of Kuboniwa et al. (2005). If this is the case, the share of industry should be 
increased by some 10 percent, and the share of the trade sector should be reduced 
accordingly (here, we neglect net taxes on products). This outcome completely 
changes the structure of the Russian GDP and determines that the contribution of 
the oil and gas sector to Russian economic growth must be reconsidered. 
 
Table 1. Value Added at Basic Prices
Component 2000 2001 2002 2003
Industry 28.2 25.2 24.4 23.9
Oil and gas sector 7.8 6.7 6.6 6.8
Transportation and communications 8.0 8.5 8.4 8.1
  Transportation margins of oil and gas 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.8
Trading & intermediary services 21.2 26.6 26.7 26.9
  Trade margins of oil and gas 10.7 7.7 7.4 7.7
Net taxes on products 11.4 12.3 11.5 12.1
  On oil and gas 4.6 5.0 4.1 4.5
Total contribution of oil and gas sector 24.1 20.5 19.0 19.8
   Contribution excluding refined oil 18.7 15.9 14.5 15.1
Sources: Kuboniwa et al.,  2005, p.7; Sistema, 2005, 2006; and unpublished Rosstat data.
Notes: Total contribution of oil and gas implies value added of oil and gas at market prices.
(percent of total GDP at market prices; old sector classification)
  
 
The method employed is based on a modification of the input-output tables 
(i.e., supply and use tables), involving a change of the units of statistical 
observation from enterprises to enterprise groups. Large holdings in the oil and 
gas sector include the following types of enterprises: (1) producing enterprises that 
extract and process oil and gas; and (2) trading enterprises that sell the oil and gas 
in domestic and international markets. Both are independent legal entities that 
generate their own statistical reports. As the main activities of the first type 
comprise extraction, the value that they add is not large. The value added by the 
second type (sales) is considerably larger than that of the producing enterprises, 
because the gross revenue of foreign trading enterprises is the difference between 
international and domestic price levels. Thus, for example, in 2002 the average 
export price of gas was more than 11 times higher than the gas producers’ price. 
 
 
3Such considerable price differentials accounted for the main income of the 
country’s largest and exclusive gas exporter (trading enterprise), Gazprom. These 
two types of enterprises are independent legal entities but both are completely 
controlled by Gazprom. The same situation is observed in Russian oil majors, 
including Lukoil. Lukoil is registered as a trading and intermediary enterprise, 
while crude oil extraction enterprises, affiliations controlled by Lukoil are 
registered as crude oil extraction enterprises. We integrated two types of 
enterprises into enterprise groups. It should be noted that the resulting 
discrepancy can be traced to the sector’s specific characteristics rather than to 
faulty methodological treatment by Rosstat. In Table 1 a part of the pipeline 
transportation margins is added to value added of oil and gas because gas pipeline 
transportation is monopolized by Gazprom and oil pipeline transportation is 
monopolized by Transneft which can be regarded as a portion of the oil industry 
group.    
Rosstat reorganized all statistics by sector based on the new industrial 
classification corresponding to the International and European standard, NACE 
v.1. The official input-output systems (supply and use tables; SUTs) for 2004 and 
2005 were made public in SNA Russia (2007, 2008) as a highly aggregated format 
with only 15 sectors, sectors A to O in NACE. Extraction of crude oil and gas is 
integrated into the mining sector. Although the mining sector excludes oil 
processing and includes extraction of coal, ore and so on, the major part of the 
mining sector consists of crude oil and gas, key products of Russia. And the 
specific Russian characteristics have remained unchanged. In 2005 the average 
export price of gas (151 dollars per 1,000 m
3) was approximately 13 times higher 
than the gas producers’ price (11.7 dollars per 1,000 m
3). In 2005 the average 
export price of crude oil (330 dollars per ton; 45.2 dollars per barrel) was also 
approximately 2 times higher than the crude oil producers’ price (170 dollars per 
ton; 23.3 dollars per barrel).(Tseny, 2008, pp.138-139.) These price differentials 
generate trade margins of the mining sector for 2005. Therefore, we made 
modifications to the SUTs for 2004 and 2005 with a method similar to Kuboniwa et 
al. (2005). We did not introduce any modification to transportation margins 
because data on oil and gas pipeline transportation margins are not available and 
coal transportation (railroad etc.) margins, which cannot be attributed to the coal 
enterprise group, may occupy a large share of transportation margins of mining. 
By adding a part of the value added attributed to the trade sector (as trade 
margins and net taxes on mining products) to the official figure, we obtain the 
 
 
4following figures: 17.9 percent in 2004 and 20.4 percent in 2005 which are twice as 
large as the official figures. Most of the net taxes on mining products are generated 
by export taxes on crude oil and gas products, which constitute the main sources of 
the stabilization fund of the Russian federal government. Official GDP statistics, s, 
usually provides the value added at basic prices. However, trade margins and net 
taxes on products by sector can be derived only from supply tables compiled by 
Rosstat.  
 
Table 2. Value Added at Basic Prices 
Component 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Industry 27.8 29.3 28.1 27.4 26.0
Mining sector 8.7 10.2 9.4 8.7 8.1
Trading & intermediary services 17.8 16.8 17.6 17.7 18.1
  Trade margins of mining products 5.6 4.8
Transportation and communications 9.5 8.9 8.5 8.3 8.2
  Transportation margins of mining products … …
Net taxes on products 12.7 14.2 14.6 14.0 15.1
  On mining products 3.5 5.4
Total contribution of mining sector 17.9 20.4
(percent of total GDP at market prices; new sector classification)
Sources: Author's estimation based on SUT for 2004-2005 (SNA Russia, 2007, 2008) and  www.gks.ru.
 
  
    The aforementioned method allows us to modify the matrix of outputs of the 
supply table so that sales, which support the marketing of the sector’s products, 
are treated as secondary activities in the mining industry. Table 3 presents a 
fragment of the modified supply table for the year 2005.   
 
Table 3. Fragment of the Modified Supply Table for 2005
Products and services Mil. Pct. of Mil. Pct. of
rubles total rubles total
Mining extraction products 2,885,715.2 90.2 2,885,715.2 60.1
Other industrial products 272,992.9 8.5 272,992.9 5.7
Trading & intermediary services 10,295.8 0.3 1,611,814.6 33.6
    Foreign trade services 805,813 16.8
Transportation  services 15,180.3 0.5 15,180.3 0.3
   Export transport services
Real estate services 15,901.2 0.5 15,901.2 0.3
Total 3,200,085.4 100.0 4,801,604.2 100.0
Sources: Author's estimation based on supply table for 2005 (SNA Russia, 2008) and unpublished
Rossat data.
Mining sector (industry) Mining sector (industry)





The analysis of the structure of the sector’s output presented in Table 3 
indicates that the share of trading and intermediation services (which are 
essentially secondary types of activity or product) in the mining industry amounts 
to more than 30 percent of the industry’s output. One half of this share is occupied 
by foreign trade activities. Although not shown here, the share of such services in 
the gas sector can be estimated to be several times higher than the output of the 
sector’s main activity (i.e., extraction). From the perspective of SNA framework, 
such a modified output matrix may appear peculiar. One should remember, 
however, that it does reflect the realities of the Russian economy.   
After appropriate modifications of the supply table, we also made changes in 
the use table. Due to the lack of data on the structure of input consumed by trade 
activities of the mining sector, we simply applied the overall value added ratio 
(value added to output) given in the original use table to calculations of the value 
added of trade activities related to the mining sector. Details of our estimation for 
2004 and 2005 are shown by Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Estimation Method for 2004 and 2005
2004 2005
1T r a d e  m a r gin of mining Mil. rubles 1,472,953 1,611,815
2 Value added ratio of total trade sector 0.65056 0.65060
3 Value added ratio of trade of mining Line 3=Line 2 0.65056 0.65060
4 Value added of trade of mining Mil. rubles 958,244 1,048,647
5 Value added of trade of mining  Pct. of GDP  5.6 4.8
Notes:
Line 1 is from the official supply table and Table 3 for 2004-2005.
Line 2 is calculated from the official use table for 2004-2005.
Line 3 makes a crucial assumption that Line 3 equals Line 2.
Line 4 is derived from (Line 1)*(Line 3).
Line 5 is derived from (Line 4)/( total GDP at market prices).
All components at basic prices




  To examine plausibility of our estimation, we applied the method to estimate 
the corresponding value added of trade services of the oil and gas sector for 
2000-2003. As indicated by Table 5, the differences between estimates by Rosstat 








2000 10.7 10.2 0.5
2001 7.7 7.7 0.0
2002 7.4 8.9
2003 7.7 8.0
Sources: Table 1 and author's calculations.
Value added generated by trade of oil
and gas at basic prices
Table 5. Application of the Method Employed Here to Oil and
Gas for 2000-2003.





All of sectoral value added data compiled by Rosstat, irrespective of SNA 
(GDP) statistics or input-output tables, are evaluated at basic prices, which exclude 
net taxes on products. To obtain the sectoral value added at market prices or 
sectoral GDP, net taxes on products should be allocated to each sector or industry 
in an appropriate manner. Taxes on exports of crude oil and gas are paid by the 
trading companies of crude oil and gas. Although we can allocate net taxes on 
mining products to the trade sector, we lose the information of source products of 
the taxes. Employing our methodology, these problems are avoided. It should also 
be noted that most fixed capital investments for oil and gas extraction have been 
financed from profits and revenues from foreign trade of crude oil and gas. A 
rational method to prevent losing the relationship among profits, investments 
(fixed capitals) and production is also proposed here. Except for the mining and 
trade sectors, sectoral value added at market prices or sectoral GDP can be 
obtained by adding the transpose of a column vector of net taxes on products in a 
supply table to a row vector of sectoral value added at basic prices in a use table.       
Table 6 displays the change in the structure of value added (in basic prices) 
across all industries of the Russian economy caused by modification of 
input-output tables. The table also shows the result of the Russian GDP structure 
across all industries for 2005.   
As is evident, re-allocation of trade margins reduces the share of trade and 
intermediation activities in value added at basic prices from 19.6 percent to 13.9 
percent. Sectoral allocation of net taxes on products further reduces the share of 
trade and intermediation activities in GDP to 12 percent which is much less than 
corresponding shares of mining and manufacturing sectors. Sectoral allocation of 
 
 
7net taxes on products brings about increases in the GDP shares of mining as well 
as manufacturing, which amounts to the largest share, 23.3 percent. 
 












А Agriculture, hunting, and forestry 5.2 5.2 4.6
B Fishing 0.4 0.4 0.3
C Mining and quarrying 11.9 17.5 20.4
D Manufacturing 18.8 18.8 23.3
E Electricity, gas, and water supply 3.4 3.4 3.0
F Construction 5.4 5.4 5.1
G
Wholesale and retail trade; repair
of motor vehicles and household
goods
19.6 13.9 12.0
H Hotels and restaurants 0.9 0.9 1.0
I Transport and communications 10.3 10.3 9.3
J Financial intermediation 4.1 4.1 3.5
K
Real estate, leasing, and business
activities 9.9 9.9 8.6
L
Public administration and defense;
compulsory social security 5.1 5.1 4.4
M Education 2.6 2.6 2.3
N Health and social work 3.0 3.0 2.6
O
Other community, social, and
personal services 1.7 1.7 1.6
FISIM -2.4 -2.4 -2.0
Total value added (at basic prices) 100.0 100.0
GDP (at market prices) -- 100.0






83.  Contribution of the Mining Sector to Russian Economic Growth 
 
This outcome shown by Table 6 completely changes the structure of the 
Russian GDP and suggests that the contribution of the mining sector to Russian 
economic growth should be reconsidered. 
In the Russian growth calculations employing chain index with an annual 
change of the base year, the growth contribution rate of a sector at the year t is 
defined as [the value added share of the sector at year (t-1)]*[the growth rate  of 
the sector at year t]. Therefore, an increase in the value added share of a sector at 
the previous year results in an increase in the growth contribution rate of the 
sector at the current year. 
First, we consider modifications of nominal growth by sector for 2005 caused 
by changes in the minimal industrial structure. Using the official data, the nominal 
growth rates of mining, manufacturing and trade sectors in 2005 were  48.9 
percent, 30.8 percent and 20 percent respectively (see Table 7). The nominal 
growth rate of the trade sector was much less than the total nominal growth rate, 
27.6 percent. The nominal growth rate of value added related to mining trade 
showed a markedly low value, 9.4 percent. The nominal growth rate of net taxes on 
products was rather high at 42.6 percent. In particular, the nominal growth rate of 
net taxes on mining products showed a remarkably high value, 97 percent.   
 





















ab a*b cd c*d
 
Mining 8.7 48.9 4.3 17.9 45.9 8.2
Manufacturing 15.8 30.8 4.9 23.0 29.5 6.8
Trading & intermediary services 17.8 20.0 3.6 12.3 24.4 3.0
   Trade of mining 5.6 9.4 0.5 - - -
Other sectors 44.9 21.1 9.5 46.8 20.5 9.6
Net taxes on products 12.7 42.6 5.4 - - -
  On mining 3.5 97.0 3.4 - - -
  On manufacturing 7.2 26.6 1.9 - - -
  On trade 0.1 --
GDP at market 
-47.4 -0.0  -
prices 100.0 27.6 27.6 100.0 27.6 27.6
Sources: SUT for 2004 and 2005 (SNA Russia, 2007, 2008) and author's calculations.
Official data at basic prices Modified data at market prices
2005 2005
 
     
Employing the modified data, the nominal growth rates of mining and 
 
 
9manufacturing sectors became slightly less than those based on the official data, 
while the nominal growth rate of the trade sector became greater than that based 
on the official data. The contribution rate of the mining sector was 8.2 percent 
which was approximately two times higher than that based on the official data, 4.3 
percent. The contribution rate of the manufacturing sector was 6.8 percent, which 
was much higher than that based on the official data, 4.9 percent. The contribution 
rate of the trade sector was 3 percent, which was slightly higher than that based on 
the official data, 3.6 percent. Thus, the major sources of nominal GDP growth 
were the mining and manufacturing sectors. 
Next we consider modifications of real growth by sector for 2005 caused by 
changes in the minimal industrial structure at the base year and in the coverage of 
mining and trade sectors. 
The growth rate of value added of trade of mining products is not known.  
The growth rates of value added of trade sub-sectors should be based on their 
trade turnovers. Foreign trade turnovers or exports of crude oil and gas showed 
negative growth in real terms for 2005 and 2006 as shown below. There is no 
reason to apply high growth rates of the trade sector in the official data to the 
growth of trade of mining products. Therefore, we assumed that the growth rate of 
value added of trade of mining products is equal to that of the value added of the 
mining sector in the official data. 
     
Table 8. Modifications of Real Growth by Sector for 2005 and 2006
Sector 2005 2006 2005 2006
Mining 0.5 0.04
Manufacturin
-3.3  -0.3 




Other sectors 2.5 3.1
Net taxes on 
. 2
products 9.4 9.1 1.2 1.3
GDP at market prices 6.4 7.7 6.4 7.7
Mining 2.3 0.4
Manufacturin
-0.004  -0.001 
g 7 . 17 . 9 1 . 61
Trading & intermediary
services
13.5 21.1 1.7 2.5
Other sectors 2.7 3.3
G D P  6 . 47 . 7 6 . 47




Official data at basic prices






10     
This resulted in marked increases in the growth rates of the trade sector based 
on the modified data from 9.4 percent to 13.5 percent in 2005 and from 14.1 
percent to 21.1 percent in 2006 because a large part (the value added of trade of 
mining) with lower growth was removed from the original value added of the trade 
sector. The high growth rates of the trade sector may be largely due to the boost of 
trade turnover of imported goods. 
    Unlike trade margins, sectoral growth rates of net taxes on products are 
uniform. The official total growth of net taxes on products was higher than the 
macro growth. Accordingly, allocation of net taxes on product to mining and 
manufacturing sectors makes the growth rates of these sectors higher than the 
values  prior  to  modifications.       
In Table 8 we present the results. Based on modified data, the contribution 
rates of the mining, manufacturing and trade sectors for 2005 were 0.4 percent, 1.6 
percent and 1.7 percent respectively. The corresponding rates for 2006 were zero 
(-0.001) percent, 1.8 percent and 2.5 percent respectively. The contribution of the 
trade sector to Russian economic growth was the largest for 2005 and 2006, 
followed by the manufacturing sector’s contribution. The contribution of the 
mining sector, including crude oil and gas, to Russian economic growth was almost 
non-existent. 
Generally, according to the Russian GDP statistics in real terms the net 
exports have not contributed to the GDP growth. The real income growth in 
Russia prior to the Lehman shock , however, seemed to have been much greater 
than the real GDP growth owing to the marked increase in the terms-of-trade 
effects (TT) arising from high oil prices. This gap in perception can be solved by 
employing the so called “command GDP,” which is defined as real GDP plus 
terms-of-trade effects (see Kuboniwa, 2007). 
The terms-of-trade effect expressed in base-year prices can be defined as 
follows: 
TTr = (En - Mn)/P - (Er - Mr) = Mｒ(１- Pm/P) + Eｒ(Pe/P - 1 )                 
Er = En/Pe, Mr = Mn/Pm , 
where subscripts r and n denote the real and nominal terms respectively. TT is the 
terms-of-trade effects, and E and M are the exports and imports respectively. Pe 
and  Pm are the export and import deflators respectively, and P  is a common 
deflator of exports and imports. 
If we set P= Pm , then TTr = Eｒ(Pe/ Pm – 1).   
 
 
11We employ this result in our calculations with an assumption that the above 
macro relations are applicable to sectoral relations using a uniform macro deflator, 
namely the import price index. We consider only the crude oil and gas sector’s 
terms-of-trade effects. Table 9 is obtained by adding these effects to the GDP of the 
mining sector. 
 
Table 9. Terms-of-Trade Effects and Growth of "Command GDP"
2005 2006
Mining sector 38.0 15.6
Total economy 12.9 10.7
Memo:  
Exports of crude oil and gas (mil. $) 114,812 146,089
Real growth rate of exports of crude oil and gas at
previous year prices (pct.)





port price index of crude oil and gas 1.439 1.295
Import price index of the country 0.970 1.056
Terms-of-trade effect of crude oil and gas (mil. $) 38,522 25,525
Terms-of-trade effect of crude oil and gas (mil. rubles) 1,090,172 693,985




(annual percentage change at previous year prices)
 
 
The growth rate of command GDP of mining sector accounted for 38 percent 
in 2005 and 15.6 percent in 2006. In this context, we can state that the 
contribution of the mining sector to Russian economic growth in real terms was 
extremely large for 2005 and 2006.   
     
4.    Diversification of the Russian Economy   
 
The Russian economy is heavily reliant upon the mining sector including 
crude oil and natural gas. This situation will not change for the foreseeable future. 
Even so, recent policy direction for reforming Russia’s industrial structure should 
also be noted and studied. As is well known, the Russian government has adopted a 
policy targeting diversification and thus, moving away from heavy dependence on 
oil and gas. 
Table 10 shows the government’s target for long-term changes in the Russian 
 
 
12industrial structure. The government expects the GDP share of the oil and gas 
sector will show decreases from 19.7 percent in 2006 to 15.6 percent in 2015 and 
12.1 percent in 2020. In contrast, the GDP share of the “high-tech” industry is 
expected to show increases from 10.5 percent in 2006 to 13.8 percent in 2015 and 
18.9 percent in 2020. The government’s figure of the GDP share of oil and gas in 
2006 proves that the government employs our methodology, shown in Table 1. The 
government relied upon the increasing trend of manufacturing, including the 
machinery industry, in contrast to the decreasing trend of mining, including crude 
oil and gas for 2000-2007. Although the Russian government, in its long run plan, 
did not provide feasible policy measures to realize its target, we can state that the 
auto-industry is expected to become a key factor for the diversification and 
modernization of the Russian economy. 
 
Table 10. Long Term Prospect for Changes in Russian Industrial Str
(Pct. of total GDP at 2006 market prices)
2006 2010 2015 2020
Sector actual
"High-tech" 10.5 11.2 13.8 18.9
Oil and gas 19.7 16.3 15.6 12.1
Resource materials 8.4 7.9 7.4 6.8
Transport 6.6 6.2 5.5 4.9
Trade 17.7 14.5 13.6 12.2
Others 37.1 44.0 43.9 45.1
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: ThetTable shows the optimistic case (innovative case).
forecast
Source: MER,  2007, p.35.
The " high-tech" sector or the "innovative" sector should consist of
the machinery industry, science, information-communication




Table 11 shows an international comparison of the auto-industry including all 
motor vehicles and auto-components. The GDP share of the auto-industry in Japan 
(2000), USA (2000), and Germany (2002) with the most advanced foreign-make 
cars was 1.6, 1.2, and 3.1 percent respectively. 
The table also shows the auto-industry’s GDP share in BRICs. The GDP share 
of the auto-industry in Brazil (2005), Russia (2005), India (2003/2004), and China 
(2002) was 2, 1, 1, and 1.5 percent, respectively. Brazil showed the largest share of 
BRICs. The domestic production level of passenger cars in 2005 was 2 million 
 
 
13(Brazil), 1.1 million (Russia), 1.3 million (India), and 3.1 million (China) in 
physical number (Automotive Yearbook, 2009). In 2002, China’s passenger car 
production was 1.1 million. This suggests that Russia’s position in the 
auto-industry was the lowest of all BRICs in 2005. All BRICs showed rapid 
development in the auto-industry in the 2000s before the world crisis. The 
auto-industry in China and India, with small and cheap cars, has continued its 
rapid growth after the Lehman shock, while only Russia has shown a rapid fall. 
 














Sources: Author's estimation using input-output tables.
Notes:
The Russian GDP for 1987 is and estimate by Kuboniwa and Ponomarenko.
The GDPs of auto-industry of all countries are evaluated at market prices.
 
 
In 1987 of the Soviet era, the auto-industry’s GDP share of Russia was 2.4 
percent with a passenger car production of 1.2 million. This was achieved in a 
non-competitive environment. The Russian auto-industry’s challenge in a 
competitive environment started just before the global economic crisis. Now it is 
facing serious difficulties. However, Russia must develop the auto-industry if it  
really would like to achieve diversification of the economy. Russia has no other 












1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008









Fig.1 shows the Russian dynamics of passenger or light cars produced and 
imported in physical unit numbers. From this, we can report the following: 
First, the boost of passenger or light car imports began in 2005 and continued 
until 2008. The number of car imports reached about 2 million in 2008, which was 
3.3 times higher than the number imported in 2004. In particular, it showed a 
remarkably high growth at 47 percent in 2007. Although it slowed down in the 
second half of 2008, it showed high year-on-year growth at 24 percent in 2008 
thanks to a boost in the first half of the year.   
Second, the number of passenger or light cars produced in Russia or 
homemade cars exceeded the Soviet peak level in 2006 and showed marked 
increases at 10 percent in 2007 and 15 percent in 2008. It reached about 1.5 million, 
which was 1.34 times higher than the number produced in 2004. 
Fig.2 shows the structural change in Russia's domestic light car production. 
The boost of foreign-make cars made in Russia has been the major source for 
an increase in domestic light car production for 2001-2008. The number of 
foreign-make light cars made in Russia increased from 5,000 in 2001 to 591,000 in 
2008, i.e., by more than 100 times. Its share in the total domestic production 



















The Russian government, as well as most Russian traditional carmakers, 
clearly reached the perception that Russian-make cars cannot be competitive in 
quality. Russian large carmakers, except for AvtoVAZ producing LADA, shifted to 
the assembly of foreign-make (foreign-brand) cars. Major foreign carmakers 
began to expand their assembly in Russia, making full use of preferential import 
duties on car components, based on “the Industrial Assembly” regime introduced 
in 2005. Thus, the boost in the assembly of foreign-make cars in the territory of 
Russia was brought about. 
The Industrial Assembly regime assumes preferential duties on car component 
imports for (foreign or Russian) car assembly plants under the local content that 
they should meet the requirement of a higher than 30 percent self-sufficiency rate 
of components within 4.5 years of their production start. Namely, makers enjoying 
the Industrial Assembly regime are required to switch from CKD (complete 
knockdown method) to SKD (semi-knockdown method) in several years. A marked 
increase in the self-sufficiency rate is in the common interest of both the Russian 
government and the foreign makers. The foreign makers need to raise the 
self-sufficiency rate to at least 70 percent to reduce their production costs. The 
governments expect that this increase will bring about a radical development of the 
Russian industrial base, which has been the major bottleneck for Russian 
manufacturing. 
    The government expects foreign assembly makers to organize the production 
of auto-components in Russia by themselves. Unlike the cases of China, India and 
Brazil, the Russian government had no industrial policy for the further 
 
 
16development of the domestic production of components and parts except for the 
extension of the Industrial Assembly regime to foreign and Russian auto-part 
makers. The government should provide a more favorable investment environment 
for auto-part makers, including Russian SMEs and foreign giants. 
According to our rough simulation using the unpublished 2004 input-output 
tables (SUT) with an explicitly separate auto-industry sector compiled by Rosstat, 
the Russian total GDP will show a 4 to 5 percent increase when the net final 
demand for automobiles becomes twice the level of 2004 by the reduction of car 
imports (import substitution) and/or some other reasons. In our simulation the 
self-sufficiency rate of auto-component is fixed at 30 percent. If the self-sufficiency 
rate of auto-components shows an increase to more than 70 percent, the expansion 
effect of the auto-industry on the GDP would be much greater through the 
reduction of imports for the auto-industry. It should be noted here that both an 
assembled car and its components belong to the auto-industry sector. Thus, the 
expansion of domestic car production would provide a basis for the further 
development of the diversification of the Russian economy away from its 
dependence on the oil and gas sector. 
 
5.  Russian  Growth  Accounting 
 
Fig. 3 presents the author’s calculations of macro growth accounting of the 
Russian economy for 2001-2008 based on our estimates of the capital stock and 
capital distribution ratio (70 percent) and the official data on GDP and 
employment (see Kuboniwa, 2008, 2009a). As is evident, the major source of  
Russian growth was TFP (Total factor Productivity) for 2001-2007, followed by the 
capital increment which showed steady growth. The TFP showed a marked decline 
in 2008 and further decline is expected in 2009.   
    For 2001-2007 the average growth rate for Russia was 6.6 percent. Average 
contributions of capital, labor and TFP to this growth were 2.3, 0.2 and 4.1 percent, 
respectively. Namely, more than 60 percent of the growth was due to the TFP 
contribution. When we employ the official data of the growth rates of capital stock 
(www.gks.ru), the average contributions of capital, labor and TFP to the growth 
amounted to 1.2, 0.2, and 5.2 percent, respectively. Approximately 80 percent of 
the growth was due to the TFP contribution. Smaller capital contributions induced 
greater TFP contributions. TFP incorporates all components of technical progress 
due to capital replacement, management reforms and so on.       
 
 
17Fig. 3　Growth Accounting (contribution rate; percent)



















Sources: www.gks.ru and author's estimations. 
 
    Here we present the preliminary results of sectoral growth accounting. It 
should be noted that in the beginning of 2009 Rosstat made an upward revision of 




Table 12. Sectoral Growth Accounting of the Russian Industry for 2005-2007
  (Percent) 










2005 6.0 4.1 2.9 3.8 8.4 1.9
2006 7.3 4.6 3.2 4.5 8.6 2.7
2007 8.1 6.1 0.2 4.2 0.1 3.8 7.9 2.0
Electricity,  gas, and water supply
2005 1.2 3.1 0.6 2.2 0.2 0.6
2006 5.7 3.1 0.6 2.2 0.2 3.4 5.1 2.6
2007 0.4 4.5 3.1 1.5
Sources: Author's calculations.
Growth Contribution Growth
-3.4  -1.0 -3.4  -6.5 
-3.3  -0.8  -0.2 -8.9  -2.5  -11.7 
-2.7  -0.5  -0.1 -9.4  -2.2  -12.5 
-2.4  -0.7 
-1.3  -0.4 
-1.2  -1.9 
-1.1  -0.3 -2.4  -4.1 
   
    Table 12 shows the results using the official growth rates of value added by 
sector. High increases in capital stock of the mining sector did not induce its 
economic growth because they were not accompanied by any technical progress, 
 
 
18which is shown by negative TFP contributions. Due to terms-of-trade effects the 
mining sector was able to increase capital stock but this has not yet brought about 
the corresponding economic growth of domestic production.    .     
    In contrast, the high growth rates of the value added of the manufacturing 
sector were caused by capital increments as well as TFP contributions. Labor 
productivity also showed rapid growth. Regarding the electricity, gas and water 
supply sector, the better growth of the sector in 2006 was due to the TFP 
contribution as well as capital increment. In both 2005 and 2007, no contribution 
of the TFP was observed.     
   Table 13 shows the results using estimates of the sectoral GDP growth rates. 
The higher economic growth rates of the mining and manufacturing sectors 
resulted in improvements in the TFP contributions. 
  
Table 13 Sectoral Growth Accounting based on Estimated GDP for 2005-2006
(Percent) 






2005 2.3 7.0 4.9 5.7
2006 8.4 5.8 0.8
Manufacturing
2005 7.1 4.1 2.9 4.9 9.5 3.0
2006 7.9 4.6 3.2 5.0 9.1 3.3
Sources: Author's calculations.
Growth Contribution Growth
-3.4  -1.0 -1.7  -4.8 
-0.004 -0.8  -0.2 -5.6  -8.4 
-2.4  -0.7 
-1.3  -0.4 
 
 
    Table 14 displays the author’s preliminary calculations of growth accounting 
of the machinery sector for 2005-2007. The table shows that rather high growth 
rates of the machinery sector were caused by high TFP contributions and 
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Table 14　Growth Accounting of the Machinery Industry
（Percent）
Growth Growth
　 GDP Capital labor TFP Labor
productivity
2005 10.4 0.4 11.8 16.3
2006 8.6 1.3 8.5 12.4







6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The Russian economy depends on the mining sector including crude oil and 
gas. The dependence on oil and gas has been much heavier than the situation 
shown by the official data. Terms-of-trade effects caused by increases in oil prices 
had induced much higher growth than that shown by the official figure. 
Nevertheless, some developments of diversification in the Russian economy were 
also found. They included an increase in the domestic production of foreign-make 
cars and better growth of manufacturing due to TFP contributions and capital 
increments.  
    After steady growth for 1999-2008, Russia entered a recession together with 
the rest of the world due to the global financial crisis. Now, we cannot expect 
positive terms-of-trade effects, such as oil windfalls, and improvements in the TFP 
of manufacturing sectors. The terms-of-trade effects disappeared in 2008. In spite 
of rather high oil prices, around 60 US dollars per barrel, the effects will not 
appear in 2009. The Russian economy will need more time to recover from the 
present deteriorations.   
    Regarding the input-output data base of Russia, the following points are 
noteworthy. First, more disaggregated SUTs, with 50 to 100 sectors, should be 
made public. Second, a time-series of SUTs in real terms should be prepared. 
Third, a compilation of capital stock vectors or matrices corresponding to SUTs 
would provide an appropriate database for the policy making of diversification of 
the Russian economy. 
        Whether “dreaming with Russia” will come true is still debatable. This paper 
provides only preliminary observations on this issue from lens of input-output 
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